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INTRODUCTION 
 Consider two young children, both of the same age. One was conceived be-
fore her father went off to war and never returned, leaving the mother to carry 
and raise her daughter alone. The other was conceived after his father died of 
cancer, his mother left to carry and raise her son alone. Both are posthumous 
children. Both apply for Social Security Survivor’s benefits. The child con-
ceived before her father died receives them. The child conceived after his father 
died does not.1  
By definition, a posthumous child is a child that is born after the death of 
one of his or her parents.2 There are two scenarios in which a posthumous child 
can be conceived and born: (1) fertilization occurs prior to the death of the 
partner, and birth happens after death; or (2) both fertilization and birth occur 
after the death of the partner through the surviving partner’s use of Assistive 
Reproductive Technologies and the decedent’s genetic material.3 The first sce-
nario can occur naturally, and is, therefore, the primary focus of many state 
statutes addressing the topic. However, advancements in technology have cre-
ated an opportunity for reproduction that is not considered in nature: a child 
conceived and born after one, or maybe even both, of its genetic parents has 
died. Such an opportunity is achieved through the use of Assistive Reproduc-
tive Technology, or ART.4 The field of ART is comprised of many forms of 
reproductive assistance—including the cryopreservation of genetic material and 
in-vitro fertilization procedures—drastically extending the amount of time the 
average human has to reproduce, in some cases up to twenty-two years after 
death.5 Because of these advancements, “decisions and enactments from earlier 
                                                        
1  See Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions: Social Securi-
ty Survivor’s Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 251, 252 
(1999). 
2  See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 109 (Vicki 
Been et al. eds., 9th ed. 2013). 
3  G. Pennings et al., ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law 11: Posthumous Assisted Re-
production, 21 HUM. REPROD. 3050, 3050 (2006). 
4  AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: A GUIDE FOR 
PATIENTS 4 (2015). 
5  Id.; Healthy Baby Born 22 Years After Father’s Sperm Was Frozen, NEWS MED. LIFE SCI. 
(Apr. 15, 2009, 5:59 AM), http://www.news-medical.net/news/2009/04/15/48357.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/DJZ9-YX98] [hereinafter Healthy Baby]. 
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times—when human reproduction was in all cases a natural and uniform pro-
cess—do not fit the needs of this more complex era.”6 
In the United States, only twenty-five states have statutes that address 
posthumously conceived children and their inheritance rights.7 Five of these 
states have statutes that expressly deny inheritance rights to posthumously con-
ceived children.8 The remaining twenty states have statutes that grant inher-
itance rights to posthumously conceived children.9 Currently, the state of Ne-
vada is one of the states that does not have a statute explicitly addressing 
posthumously conceived children.10 
Although posthumously conceived children are still relatively rare, schol-
ars, judges, and other officials have strongly encouraged updates to state stat-
utes and probate codes, requesting legislative guidance on these issues.11Some 
may ask, “if these posthumously conceived children are so rare, then why is it 
necessary to amend or enact a statute that addresses their inheritance rights?” 
To start with, enacting such statutes will give certainty to public and judicial 
officials, and will protect the equal protection rights of posthumously con-
ceived children, who have the immutable characteristic of being conceived af-
ter the death of one or more parents.12 Despite this immutable characteristic, the 
Supreme Court has left the determination of whether posthumously conceived 
children can inherit to the states.13 The Supreme Court ruled in Astrue v. Ca-
                                                        
6  In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 209 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2007). 
7  David Shayne, Posthumously Conceived Child as Heir Depends on Where, 42 EST. PLAN. 
28, 29 (2015). 
8  These states include Florida, Illinois, Minnesota, Ohio, and Virginia. Id. 
9  The remaining states include Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Del-
aware, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. 
10  See id. 
11  Steven H. Snyder, New Developments in Assisted Reproductive Technology and Their 
Effects on Estate Planning 2 (May 6–7, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
American Bar Association Section of Real Property, Trust, and Estate Law). 
We join the chorus of judicial voices pleading for legislative attention to the increasing number 
of complex legal issues spawned by recent advances in the field of assisted reproduction. What-
ever merit there may be to a fact-driven case-by-case resolution of each new issue, some over-all 
legislative guidelines would allow the participants to make informed choices and the courts to 
strive for uniformity in their decisions. 
Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)). 
12  See Julie E. Goodwin, Not All Children Are Created Equal: A Proposal to Address Equal 
Protection Inheritance Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children, 4 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 
234 (2005). 
Courts should use intermediate scrutiny to determine whether an exclusion of inheritance 
by posthumously conceived children violates the Equal Protection Clause. Intermediate scrutiny 
applies because (1) the classification is based on an immutable characteristic; (2) posthumously 
conceived, like other non-marital children, have a history of being discriminated against; and (3) 
it is unfair to put the burden on an individual who has no control over the situation. 
Id. at 286. 
13  See Nicole M. Barnard, Note, Astrue v. Capato: Relegating Posthumously Conceived 
Children to Second-Class Citizens, 72 MD. L. REV. 1039, 1039 (2013). 
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pato that the individual state’s intestacy statutes determine whether a posthu-
mously conceived child receives the deceased parent’s Social Security Bene-
fits.14 
A statute addressing the unique challenges of posthumously conceived 
children would also assist states in the administration of future interests. In a 
world where technology creates the possibility that children could be born 
twenty-two years after the death of their parents,15 complications could arise 
involving the rule against perpetuities, or with timely estate administration for 
those states that simply allow all posthumous children to be considered living at 
the death of their parents.  
In addition to assisting the state’s probate courts with estate administration, 
a statute addressing posthumously conceived children will also help alleviate 
many private concerns of the surviving parent. Since posthumously conceived 
children are often born into single parent homes, in many cases, the surviving 
parent and other family members experience financial strain.16 “Denying these 
children intestate inheritance rights and survivor’s benefits puts an even greater 
financial strain on the family, particularly in light of the purpose of such bene-
fits, providing financial resources for those loved ones left without the income 
of a deceased parent or spouse.”17 
Even if the deceased parent does not leave assets that can pass by intestacy, 
a statute declaring that posthumously conceived children are the heirs of their 
deceased parents could have implications for their future property rights.18 For 
example, a parent dying at a young age could still potentially have assets 
passed to them at a future date through their ancestors. Identifying a posthu-
mously conceived child as the heir of that deceased parent would enable the 
child to take by representation (or by other applicable ways of passing proper-
ty), and it would prevent lengthy and unnecessary probate disputes between the 
genetic child of the decedent and the decedent’s other relatives.  
 It is for these reasons that this note strongly recommends that the state of 
Nevada consider enacting a statute that addresses the inheritance rights of post-
humously conceived children.  
Part I of this note will provide definitions and a brief history of posthu-
mously conceived children, including a discussion of their rights at common 
law, as well as descriptions regarding the essential technology used in the crea-
tion of posthumously conceived children. Part II will include a discussion of 
current Uniform Acts as well as cases that have addressed the issue of posthu-
mously conceived children. Part III will contain a discussion of current Nevada 
                                                        
14  Astrue v. Capato, 566 U.S. 541, 559 (2012). 
15  Healthy Baby, supra note 5. 
16  Christopher A. Scharman, Note, Not Without My Father: The Legal Status of the Posthu-
mously Conceived Child, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1001, 1024 (2002). 
17  Id. 
18  See In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1260 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000); In re 
Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2007). 
17 NEV. L.J. 773 RAMEY - FINAL.DOCX 5/10/17  3:05 PM 
Summer 2017] POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED CHILDREN 777 
law relating to posthumously conceived children, and how a statute, or the lack 
thereof, will influence that law. Part IV will identify the four necessary factors 
that lawmakers should consider in drafting a statute granting inheritance rights 
to posthumously conceived children, address the pros and cons of each of those 
factors in turn, and make a recommendation based upon those considerations. 
I.   DEFINITIONS AND HISTORY 
A.   Posthumous Children? Posthumously Conceived Children? What Is the 
Difference, and Why Does It Matter? 
A posthumous child is by definition a child conceived before but born after 
the death of a parent.19 The stereotypical scenario in which a posthumous child 
is born is when a husband impregnates his wife and then dies sometime during 
the nine months between conception and pregnancy.20 Imagining an instance in 
which this could occur is quite simple. A soldier goes off to war, a factory 
worker becomes fatally wounded in a work-related accident, or perhaps a more 
natural occurrence, such as a heart attack or stroke, could prevent the father 
from seeing the birth of his offspring.  
Under the common law, these posthumous children were originally consid-
ered “non-marital” children, the children of no one, and thus were unable to in-
herit.21 “This could even include children who were conceived by married par-
ents but born after the father’s death, because upon the father’s death, his 
marriage to the unborn child’s mother was considered dissolved, and the child 
simply became a non-marital child.”22 Under the common law, non-marital 
children were unable to inherit from either parent.23 Moving away from the 
common law, all fifty states have now recognized that non-marital children can 
inherit through their mother—although, they differ in the treatment of inher-
itance through their father.24 The Supreme Court has recognized that, in some 
cases, the disparate treatment of non-marital children is unconstitutional.25 
Shifting societal norms have altered the stigma surrounding non-marital chil-
dren, and the statutes and policies of many states reflect this change in values.26 
                                                        
19  DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 2. 
20  Although most hypothetical scenarios imagine a man reproducing posthumously, technol-
ogy has now advanced in such a manner where a woman could also reproduce posthumously 
(this, of course, will require a surrogate). See Ronald Chester, Posthumously Conceived 
Heirs Under a Revised Uniform Probate Code, 38 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 727, 728 
(2004). 
21  DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 2, at 110. 
22  Allison Stewart Ellis, Comment, Inheritance Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children 
in Texas, 41 ST. MARY’S L.J. 413, 419 (2012). 
23  DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 2, at 110. 
24  Id.; Ellis, supra note 22. 
25  Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 771 (1977). 
26  These changes in values can be seen through proposed uniform laws, such as the Uniform 
Parentage Act. “[T]he Act attempted to remove any derogatory language regarding non-
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Today, under the Uniform Probate Code, as well as many individual state 
probate codes, there is a rebuttable presumption that a posthumous child is the 
legal heir and descendant of the husband, provided that the child is born within 
a certain number of days after the husband’s death.27 These statutes arose out of 
the belief that a child born to a woman within the general timeframe of nine 
months after her husband’s death would be the genetic child of her husband.28  
Because of this belief, legislatures and courts alike created a legal fiction 
that such children, if born alive, would have been treated as “in being” before 
their father’s deaths, and therefore were able to inherit either through will or 
intestacy.29 Therefore, even though these fathers never get a chance to see and 
care for their children, the posthumous children can still receive support from 
their fathers through their states’ intestacy statutes; the presumption that the 
posthumous child is the legal heir of his or her father permits inheritance 
through the father’s social security benefits, trusts, and other testamentary in-
struments.30  
As progressive as these statutes are compared to the common law govern-
ing inheritance by posthumous children, advancements in technology have cre-
ated a complication that drafters did not foresee: the posthumously conceived 
child. A posthumously conceived child, unlike the posthumous child, is a child 
that is both conceived and born after the death of a parent.31 In this scenario, 
the child is conceived after the death of a parent through the use of Assisted 
Reproductive Technology and is then born to the surviving parent, in some cas-
es twenty to twenty-two years after the death of the decedent.32 Due to the cir-
cumstances surrounding their birth and conception, and the lack of statutes ad-
dressing their rights, posthumously conceived children are not immediately 
considered the legal heirs of their deceased parent.  
“By definition, posthumously conceived children are not legitimate be-
cause they are neither born nor conceived during marriage, nor can they be le-
gitimated by a deceased parent.”33 Assisted Reproductive Technology (“ART”) 
can allow for children to be born up to twenty years after the donor’s death.34 
                                                                                                                                 
marital children, thus changing ‘illegitimate’ to ‘child with no presumed father.’ ” Ellis, su-
pra note 22, at 430–31 (citing UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000), prefatory note (amended 
2002)). 
27  See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(2) (amended 2002) (300 days); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 391.070 (West 2010) (child must be born within ten months of the death of the father); LA. 
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 185 (2005) (300 days). 
28  See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(2); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.070 (child must be 
born within 10 months of the death of the father); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 185 (300 days). 
29  See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 2, at 109–11. 
30  See Emily McAllister, Defining the Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of Reproductive 
Technology: Implications for Inheritance, 29 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 55, 100 (1994). 
31  DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 2, at 112. 
32  See AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., supra note 4, at 12. 
33  Brianne M. Star, A Matter of Life and Death: Posthumous Conception, 64 LA. L. REV. 
613, 615 (2004). 
34  AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., supra note 4, at 12. 
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As a result, most cases in which posthumously conceived children are born fall 
outside the nine-month time limit prescribed by traditional posthumous-child 
statutes.35 Unless posthumously conceived children are born within state-
mandated time limits, it is possible that they will receive no benefits or inher-
itance from their deceased parents. “Technological advances in the reproduc-
tive field have reached the point where yesterday’s law cannot account for the 
consequences of modern technology.”36 
B.   Assisted Reproductive Technology 
ART refers to a broad group of techniques and procedures that include 
methods of creating pregnancy through means other than sexual intercourse.37 
In general, there are two primary types of ART: internal fertilization and exter-
nal fertilization.38 “Internal fertilization occurs inside the uterus of the woman 
who is to become pregnant (the birth mother).”39 “External fertilization occurs 
in a laboratory procedure outside the uterus and is followed by implantation of 
the fertilized egg (embryo) into the uterus of the woman who is to become 
pregnant.”40 
 It is important to note that while one would ordinarily imagine a posthu-
mously conceived child being born to his or her mother after the death of the 
father, it is equally possible for a father to have a child using the genetic mate-
rial of a deceased mother, conceived by means of ART and carried by a surro-
gate.41  
1.   Assisted Reproductive Technology Procedures 
Internal fertilization includes Artificial Insemination (“AI”) and Gamete 
Intrafallopian Transfer (“GIFT”).42 AI “involves the introduction of semen 
from either the recipient’s husband or an anonymous donor into the recipient’s 
vagina or uterus.”43 This is not a new technology—AI has been in use for hun-
dreds of years as a way for farmers to breed livestock.44 The first reported in-
                                                        
35  See, e.g., In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000); In re 
Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2007). 
36  Monica Shah, Commentary, Modern Reproductive Technologies: Legal Issues Concern-
ing Cryopreservation and Posthumous Conception, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 547, 547 (1996). 
37  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 14.8 
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
38  Id. § 14.8 cmts. a–b. 
39  Id. § 14.8 cmt. b. 
40  Id. 
41  Or even grandparents, in some instances. For an interesting case, see Woman Wins Appeal 
to Use Dead Daughter’s Eggs, BBC NEWS (June 30, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/ 
health-36675521 [https://perma.cc/YY9L-8HD4]. 
42  McAllister, supra note 30, at 63. 
43  Id. at 59. 
44  Shah, supra note 36, at 548. 
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stance of a successful human procedure was in 1790.45 On the other hand, GIFT 
is a comparatively new procedure46 where a woman’s eggs are removed from 
her ovaries and are mixed with sperm, but are not allowed to fertilize and create 
an embryo.47 The mixed sperm and eggs are then “injected into the woman who 
is to become pregnant and placed where they would be in natural fertiliza-
tion.”48  
 External fertilization, also known as In-Vitro Fertilization (“IVF”), is by 
far one of the most popular types of ART.49 IVF is a type of ART treatment that 
involves combining a woman’s eggs and a man’s sperm outside of a woman’s 
body in a laboratory dish.50 Then, “[o]ne or more fertilized eggs (embryos) may 
be transferred into the woman’s uterus, where they may implant in the uterine 
lining and develop.”51 Transfers during IVF do not always result in a successful 
pregnancy.52 In general, there is a success rate of 40 percent for IVF transfers.53  
The American Society for Reproductive Medicine notes that it is important 
to remember that a successful “clinical pregnancy”54 does not mean that the 
couple took home a live baby or that the woman successfully carried the baby 
to term.55 In a statement released last year, the Society for Assistive Reproduc-
tive Technology reported that in 2012, doctors performed “165,172 procedures, 
                                                        
45  See Catherine Belfi, Note, Birth of a New Age: A Comprehensive Review of New York In-
heritance Law Responding to Advances in Reproductive Technology, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL 
COMMENT. 113, 117–18 (2009). 
46  “The first example of GIFT involved primates during the 1970s, however, the technology 
was unsuccessful until 1984 when an effective GIFT method was invented by Ricardo Asch 
at the University of Texas Health Sciences Center and the procedure resulted in the first hu-
man pregnancy.” Hilary Gilson, Gamete Intra-Fallopian Transfer (GIFT), EMBRYO PROJECT 
ENCYCLOPEDIA (Sept. 26, 2008), https://embryo.asu.edu/pages/gamete-intra-fallopian-trans 
fer-gift [https://perma.cc/JKX6-RWNY]. 
47  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY, supra note 37, at § 14.8 cmt. b. 
48  Id. 
49  See generally History of IVF, SOC’Y FOR ASSISTIVE REPROD. TECH., 
http://www.sart.org/patients/history-of-ivf/ [https://perma.cc/73FK-8L99] (last visited Mar. 
18, 2017). 
50  AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., supra note 4. 
51  Id. 
52  Id. at 13. 
53  Id. 
54  A “clinical pregnancy” as defined by the FDA is determined by “[e]vidence of pregnancy 
by clinical (fetal heartbeat) or ultrasound parameters (ultrasound visualization of a gestation-
al sac, embryonic pole with heartbeat).” Definitions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/briefing/3985B1_03_Definitions.htm [https://perm 
a.cc/VZJ2-W9RV] (last visited Apr. 18, 2017). 
55  See AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., supra note 4, at 13 (“It is also important to understand 
the definitions of pregnancy rates and live birth rates. For example, a pregnancy rate of 40% 
does not mean that 40% of women took babies home. Pregnancy does not always result in 
live birth.”). 
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including IVF, with 61,740 babies born as a result of those efforts . . . ” in the 
United States alone.56 
In the past thirty-five years that fertility clinics have utilized IVF, over five 
million babies have been born from the use of IVF worldwide.57 Because IVF 
is an external fertilization technique, this procedure is commonly seen in cases 
of posthumous reproduction and conception, allowing for both mothers and fa-
thers to use their deceased partner’s genetic material to have children. 
2.   The Chance for Multiples 
 IVF fertility treatments often carry a higher chance for multiple pregnan-
cies (meaning pregnancies where the mother carries twins or triplets).58 Be-
cause of the low success rates of implantation during IVF, clinicians will often 
transfer multiple embryos during each IVF cycle, in the hope that one implants 
successfully.59 The number of embryos transferred depends on several factors, 
including the mother’s age and medical considerations.60 The use of multiple 
embryos during the IVF treatment causes a higher frequency of multiple preg-
nancies and births.61 
3.   Cryopreservation 
 At least “one-half of IVF patients freeze embryos for later use through a 
process called cryopreservation.”62 “Cryopreservation makes future ART cycles 
simpler, less expensive, and less invasive than the initial IVF cycle, since the 
woman does not require ovarian stimulation or egg retrieval.”63 After freezing, 
these embryos can be safely stored for long periods of time, and “live births 
have been reported using embryos that have been frozen for almost 20 years.”64 
Cryopreservation applies not only to IVF treatments and preserved embryos,65 
the eggs and sperm can be cryopreserved separately and then implanted into the 
                                                        
56  Jen Christensen, Record Number of Babies Born Via IVF, CNN (Feb. 18, 2014, 2:36 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/17/health/record-ivf-use/. [https://perma.cc/VF52-KK28]. 
57  Bonnie Rochman, 5 Million Babies Born Through IVF in the Past 35 Years, Researchers 
Say, NBC NEWS (Oct. 14, 2013, 4:54 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/health/5-million-
babies-born-through-ivf-past-35-years-researchers-8C11390532 [https://perma.cc/R45S-6FA 
P]. 
58  Bryce Weber et al., Postmortem Sperm Retrieval: The Canadian Perspective, 30 J. 
ANDROLOGY 407, 407 (2009) (stating “this reproductive technology is expensive, with inher-
ent risks, such as multiple pregnancies”). 
59  AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., supra note 4. 
60  Id. at 11. 
61  Id. at 11, 16. 
62  McAllister, supra note 30, at 62. 
63  AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., supra note 4, at 12. 
64  Id. 
65  See Alan Trounson, Preservation of Human Eggs and Embryos, 46 FERTILITY & 
STERILITY, July 1986, at 9. 
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birth mother through AI or GIFT.66 It is the use of the cryopreservation process 
that allows for children to be conceived and born years after the death of their 
parents.  
II.   STATUTES AND ACTS ENACTED IN OTHER STATES 
A.   Federal Law 
There are no federal laws specifically governing the inheritance rights of 
posthumously conceived children. The single Supreme Court case addressing 
posthumously conceived children, Astrue v. Capato, left it up to state intestacy 
statutes to determine whether a posthumously conceived child could receive 
Social Security Survivors’ benefits.67 Eighteen months after her husband died 
of cancer, Karen Capato gave birth to twins conceived through IVF using her 
husband’s cryopreserved sperm.68 To care for her children, Karen applied for 
Social Security Survivors’ benefits, which the government denied.69 The Court 
held that the twins would qualify for benefits only if they could “inherit from 
the deceased wage earner under state intestacy law.”70 
Although there is no controlling federal statute, the Uniform Probate Code 
(“UPC”), adopted by sixteen states,71 and the Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”), 
adopted by ten states,72 both offer solutions to these issues. Although several 
states have adopted either of these Uniform Acts or have written statutes of 
their own, some states still do not have statutes that even consider posthumous-
ly conceived children at all, and some even expressly disinherit them.73 
                                                        
66  Id. 
67  Astrue v. Capato, 566 U.S. 541, 553 (2012). 
68  Id. at 544. 
69  Id. 
70  Id. at 546. 
71  Although several states have partially adopted the UPC, or modeled some of their provi-
sions after it, only sixteen have adopted the UPC in full: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota and Utah. See generally RACHEL HIRSHBERG, 
LEWIS, RICE & FINGERSH, UNIFORM PROBATE CODE ADOPTION BY THE STATES, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/litigation_committees/trust/50-
state-probate-code-survey.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6QQ-H4PV] (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2017). 
72  Twenty-two states have adopted parts of the UPA, but only ten states have adopted sec-
tion 707, which deals with posthumously conceived children: Alabama, Illinois, Maine, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Enactment Sta-
tus Map, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeMap.aspx?ti 
tle=Parentage%20Act [https://perma.cc/GH8H-J8RW] (last visited Mar. 6, 2017); Shayne, 
supra note 7, at 30. 
73  See Enactment Status Map, supra note 72.  
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B.   Uniform Acts 
1.   Uniform Probate Code 
 Under the UPC, a posthumously conceived child is considered the 
decedent’s heir if the decedent signed a record that, “considering all the facts 
and circumstances,” evidenced the decedent’s intent.74 In the absence of a rec-
ord, the decedent can still be considered the parent of a posthumously con-
ceived child if the intent is established by clear and convincing evidence.75 
Therefore, a surviving parent can show that a deceased parent had the intent to 
become a parent but died before doing so. “Evidence that the decedent deposit-
ed genetic material combined with testimony of the survivor that the two of 
them discussed using the material to have children will probably suffice.”76 
Further, the posthumously conceived child will be considered a child of the de-
ceased parent “if the child is: (1) in utero not later than 36 months after the in-
dividual’s death; or (2) born not later than 45 months after the individual’s 
death.”77 “The UPC definition of the parent and child relationship will likely 
result in a finding of consent in any posthumous conception case as long as the 
genetic material was deposited before death and not harvested after death.”78 
2.   Uniform Parentage Act  
 A slightly different treatment of posthumously conceived children can be 
found in the Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”). “The Act was intended to ad-
dress the status of non-marital children, and the Commission declared that ‘all 
children should be treated equally without regard to marital status of the par-
ents.’ ”79 Under the UPA,  
If an individual who consented in a record to be a parent by assisted reproduc-
tion dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the deceased individual 
is not a parent of the resulting child unless the deceased spouse consented in a 
record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased indi-
vidual would be a parent of the child.80 
                                                        
74  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f)(1) (amended 2010). 
75  Id. § 2-120(f)(2)(C). 
76  Susan N. Gary, Definitions of Children and Descendants: Construing and Drafting Wills 
and Trust Documents, 5 EST. PLAN & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 283, 301 (2013). 
77  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k). 
78  Gary, supra note 76. 
79  Ellis, supra note 22, at 430 (quoting UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973) prefatory note, 9B 
U.L.A. 378, 379 (2001)). 
80  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (amended 2002). 
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C.   Case Law 
1.   In re Estate of Kolacy  
 One of the first recorded cases regarding posthumously conceived children 
is In re Estate of Kolacy.81 William J. Kolacy and Mariantonia Kolacy were a 
young couple residing in the state of New Jersey.82 On February 7, 1994, Wil-
liam was diagnosed with leukemia and his physician advised him to start 
chemotherapy treatment as quickly as possible.83 The next day, the couple har-
vested William’s sperm and deposited it at a local sperm bank.84 On April 15, 
1995, at the age of 26, William Kolacy died of leukemia.85 Almost a year later, 
Mariantonia began an IVF procedure using her deceased husband’s sperm.86 
The treatment was successful, and twin girls were born to Mariantonia on No-
vember 3, 1996, slightly more than eighteen months after her husband’s 
death.87 
 To assist with her effort to seek Social Security Survivors benefits from 
William for her daughters, Mariantonia sought a declaration stating that her 
daughters were the intestate heirs of her deceased husband.88 In the absence of a 
statute dealing explicitly with posthumously conceived children, the court stat-
ed 
once we establish . . . that a child is indeed the offspring of a decedent, we 
should routinely grant that child the legal status of being an heir of the decedent, 
unless doing so would unfairly intrude on the rights of other persons or would 
cause serious problems in the terms of the orderly administration of estates.89  
In this case, the court noted, there are no adverse interests or estate administra-
tion problems with recognizing the twins as William’s heirs.90  
The New Jersey Parentage Act has a provision stating that a man is pre-
sumed to be the biological father of a child if the child is born 300 days after 
death terminates the marriage.91 However, here, the court notes that this provi-
sion does not necessarily create a reverse presumption that a child born more 
than 300 days after the death of a man shall be presumed not to be the biologi-
                                                        
81  In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). 
82  Id. at 1258. 
83  Id. 
84  Id. 
85  Id. 
86  Id. 
87  Id. 
88  Id. at 1259. 
89  Id. at 1262. 
90  Id. 
91  Id. 
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cal child of the deceased man.92 Therefore, the twins were found to be Wil-
liam’s heirs under New Jersey law.93 
Although William died without a will and with no assets to pass to the 
twins under New Jersey intestacy law, the judge stated that it was still appro-
priate to determine their status as heirs “because of the impact which it may 
have upon property rights as they evolve over a period of time.”94 Such a find-
ing may affect other testamentary dispositions, such as trusts from grandpar-
ents. 
2.   In re Martin B. 
 The classic case of posthumously conceived children, found in many wills 
and trusts casebooks, is In re Martin B.95 This New York case involves the 
question of whether Martin’s posthumously conceived grandchildren would be 
considered to be his “issue” and “descendants” under his trust.96 Martin had set 
up a trust designed to “sprinkle principal” on his “issue” during the life of his 
wife Abigail.97 Martin was predeceased by his son James, who died of 
Hodgkin’s lymphoma.98 During his life, James deposited his semen at a labora-
tory with the instructions that it be cryopreserved and, in the event of his death, 
that his wife Nancy would have full discretion in what to do with the sperm.99 
At the time of his death, James had no children.100 Three years after James’s 
death, Nancy underwent an IVF procedure with his semen and gave birth to a 
boy.101 Two years after the birth of her first son, Nancy underwent another IVF 
procedure and gave birth to a second son.102 The question asked of this court is 
whether these two boys, both genetic grandchildren of Martin and born three 
and five years respectively after the death of their father, would qualify as “is-
sue” and “descendants” in such a manner as to allow them to be beneficiaries of 
the trust.103 
Although New York has since passed a statute giving rights to posthu-
mously conceived children, at the time this case was tried, New York had no 
such statute. The right of a posthumously conceived child to inherit in intesta-
cy, or as an after-born child in a will, was “limited to a child conceived during 
                                                        
92  Id. at 1263. 
93  Id. at 1264. 
94  Id. at 1260. 
95  In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2007). 
96  Id. at 208. 
97  Id. 
98  Id. 
99  Id. 
100  Id. 
101  Id. 
102  Id. 
103  Id. 
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the decedent’s lifetime.”104 Since New York did not yet have a statute address-
ing posthumously conceived children, it was necessary for the court to analyze 
the UPA and statutes from the three states that had already considered the sub-
ject to establish the paternity of the decedent’s son.105 The court also considered 
In re Kolacy and Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security,106 cases where 
courts determined posthumously conceived children to be the intestate heirs of 
their fathers despite the lack of an applicable state statute.107  
The court concluded that there were two important interests at stake in this 
case.108 First, “certainty and finality are critical to the public interests in the or-
derly administration of estates.”109 Second, “the human desire to have children, 
albeit by biotechnology, deserves respect, as do the rights of the children born 
as a result of such scientific advances.”110 To balance these interests, the court 
says, statutes “require written consent to the use of genetic material after death 
and establish a cut-off date by which the child must be conceived.”111 
Although it is difficult to imagine that Martin contemplated in 1969 that his 
“issue” or “descendants” would include grandchildren conceived after his son’s 
death, “the absence of specific intent should not necessarily preclude a deter-
mination that such children are members of the class of issue.”112 The court 
then established that the Restatement (Third) of Property considers all children 
born through the use of assisted reproductive technology to be treated for class-
gift purposes as “a child of a person who consented to function as a parent to 
the child and who functioned in that capacity or was prevented from doing so 
by an event such as death or incapacity.”113 Accordingly, the court states “these 
post-conceived infants should be treated as part of their father’s family for all 
purposes,” and children born of biotechnology with the consent of their parent 
are entitled to the same rights as a natural child.114  
3.   Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security  
 Perhaps one of the more important cases for our purposes is Woodward v. 
Commissioner of Social Security.115 This Massachusetts case clearly identifies 
three essential factors for any statute regarding posthumously conceived chil-
dren. Lauren and Warren Woodward had been married for three and a half 
                                                        
104  Id. at 209. 
105  Id. at 210 (the court used Louisiana, California, and Florida in its analysis). 
106  See supra Part II.C. 
107  In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d at 211. 
108  Id. 
109  Id. 
110  Id. 
111  Id. 
112  Id. 
113  Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 14.8 (2007)). 
114  Id. 
115  See generally Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002). 
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years when they were informed that Warren had leukemia.116 Following this 
diagnosis, the couple decided to have Warren’s sperm withdrawn and pre-
served.117 In October of 1993, nine months after Warren’s diagnosis, he died.118 
Two years later, Lauren gave birth to twin girls through the process of artificial 
insemination using Warren’s semen.119 A judge in the probate and family court 
entered a judgment of paternity for the girls, but the SSA still did not accept 
this as sufficient evidence to consider the twins the decedent’s heirs.120 A Unit-
ed States administrative law judge concluded that the children were not entitled 
to Social Security survivor benefits because the children “are not entitled to in-
herit . . . under the Massachusetts intestacy and paternity laws.”121 
 Eventually, this case was transferred to the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
to “determine the inheritance rights under Massachusetts law of children con-
ceived from the gametes of a deceased individual and his or her surviving 
spouse.”122 Under Massachusetts law, the term “issue” means all lineal or ge-
netic descendants, both marital and nonmarital.123 However, neither the Massa-
chusetts intestacy statute nor the state’s “posthumous children” statute 
addresses posthumously conceived children.124  
 The Massachusetts intestacy statute does not contain an “express, affirma-
tive requirement that posthumous children must ‘be in existence’ as of the date 
of the decedent’s death.”125 The court decided that since the legislature has not 
acted to limit various forms of assistive reproductive technology within their 
intestacy and posthumous children statutes, the legislature must intend for these 
to remain a broad statutory class of children that can inherit after the death of 
their parents.126  
The court ultimately decided that “[i]n certain limited circumstances, a 
child resulting from posthumous reproduction may enjoy the inheritance rights 
of ‘issue’ under the Massachusetts intestacy statute.”127 The court developed a 
three-part test to identify whether a child would receive these rights: (1) the 
child must have a genetic relationship to the decedent;128 (2) the decedent must 
have consented for their genetic material to be used to posthumously create a 
                                                        
116  Id. at 260. 
117  Id. 
118  Id. 
119  Id. 
120  Id. at 260–61. 
121  Id. at 261. 
122  Id. (footnote omitted). 
123  Id. at 263. 
124  Id. at 264. 
125  Id. 
126  Id. at 266. 
127  Id. at 259 (footnote omitted). 
128  Id. at 270 (placing “the burden on the surviving parent . . . to demonstrate the genetic re-
lationship of the child to the decedent”). 
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child;129 and (3) there must be a stated time limit during which the child will be 
born in order be able to settle the estate promptly.130 
 These various Uniform Acts and judicial decisions establish that there are 
three basic factors to consider when contemplating a statute for posthumously 
conceived children: genetic material, consent, and time limits. 
III.   NEVADA CURRENTLY 
Should a person die without a will, that person dies intestate, and their es-
tate will be distributed in accordance with the state intestacy statutes.131 In 
Astrue v. Capato, the Supreme Court ruled that state intestacy statutes deter-
mine whether a posthumously conceived child could receive Social Security 
Survivors benefits.132 Therefore, when analyzing the need for Nevadans to im-
plement a statute addressing the rights of Posthumously Conceived Children, 
one must first look at what intestacy means in Nevada. 
 Nevada is a community property state.133 This is significant when looking 
into revising or adding to the Nevada probate code because intestacy will be 
different depending upon whether the decedent is married or unmarried at the 
time of his or her death. Community property is defined in Black’s Law Dic-
tionary as “[a]ssets owned in common by husband and wife as a result of their 
having been acquired during the marriage by means other than an inheritance 
by, or a gift or devise to, one spouse, each spouse generally holding a one-half 
interest in the property.”134 “The basic principle of community property law is 
that all property a married couple acquires during the marriage other than by 
gift or inheritance is community property and, therefore, owned by them equal-
ly.”135 
 Practically, what this means is that within a marriage, each spouse holds 
“existing and equal interests,” or one-half of all property gained during their 
marriage.136 Under Nevada law, each person can only devise or bequeath their 
one-half share in a will.137 Property owned by the spouses before their mar-
riage, or is “acquired [after the marriage] by gift, bequest, devise, descent or by 
an award for personal injury damages, with the rents, issues and profits thereof, 
                                                        
129  Id. at 269 (“The prospective donor parent must clearly and unequivocally consent not 
only to posthumous reproduction but also to the support of any resulting child.”). 
130  Id. at 268 (“[T]he one-year limitations period . . . may pose significant burdens on the 
surviving parent, and consequently on the child.”). 
131  See Intestate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Of, relating to, or involving a 
person who has died without a valid will.”); Intestacy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014) (“The quality, state, or condition of a person’s having died without a valid will.”). 
132  Astrue v. Capato, 566 U.S. 541, 558 (2012). 
133  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.220 (2015). 
134  Community Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
135  M. READ MOORE, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: ESTATE PLANNING IN DEPTH, 
COMING SOON TO YOUR STATE: COMMUNITY PROPERTY (June 2004). 
136  NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.225(1). 
137  Id. § 123.230(1). 
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is [] separate property.”138 Separate property is owned solely by the individual 
spouses, and they may dispose of that property as they see fit.139  
 If a married individual in Nevada dies without a will, and with no children, 
his or her undivided one-half interest in the community property goes to the 
surviving spouse.140 The decedents separate property is divided “one-half to the 
surviving spouse, one-fourth to the father of the decedent and one-fourth to the 
mother of the decedent, if both are living.”141 One may think that the inher-
itance received by the surviving spouse would take care of the needs of any 
posthumously conceived children in the future, but this does not cover inher-
itances through trusts, and this inheritance by the surviving spouse does not 
meet the requirements needed for a posthumously conceived child to receive 
social security benefits.142 
 So far, we have discussed the married person’s estate under Nevada law. 
Unmarried individuals (who have never been married), as one might expect, do 
not have to worry about community property, as all the property they own is 
separate property. In this case, should a decedent die intestate, his or her prop-
erty would distribute per Nevada Revised Statute (“NRS”) section 134.143  
 When a person dies with a will, that person is considered to have died tes-
tate, and the will controls how the estate (both the decedents separate property 
and the decedents one-half interest in the community property) will be distrib-
uted.144 In Nevada, children that are born after the making of a will with no 
provision made for the child in the will:  
 [are] entitled to the same share in the estate of the testator as if the testator  had 
died intestate, unless: (a) It is apparent from the will that it was the intention  of 
the testator that no provision should be made for that child; or (b) The testator 
 provided for the omitted child by a transfer of property outside of the will and it 
 appears that the testator intended the transfer to be in lieu of a testamentary  pro-
vision.145 
The sources of this unmentioned child’s share shall be taken from the es-
tate not disposed of by the will, and if this is insufficient, “so much as is neces-
sary must be taken from all the devisees in proportion to the value they may re-
spectively receive under the will, unless the obvious intention of the testator in 
relation to some specific devise or other provision in the will would thereby be 
                                                        
138  Id. § 123.130. 
139  Id. § 123.170. 
140  Id. § 134.050. 
141  Id. As well as additional family members under NRS section 134.050. Id. § 134.050(1). 
See id. § 134, for a breakdown of how separate property is distributed in Nevada. 
142  See Stephen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1264–65 (M.D. Fla. 2005) 
(determining that children conceived after the death of their father are considered his chil-
dren, but under the state intestacy statute were not entitled to Social Security Survivors bene-
fits). 
143  See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 134.005–.210. 
144  Testate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Having left a will at death.”). 
145  NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.160. 
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defeated.”146 These statutes contain no time limits for when these unmentioned 
children can be born, and set no limits on when these unmentioned children can 
receive their share of the decedents estate. 
  As discussed earlier, posthumously conceived children can be born up to 
twenty-two years after the genetic materials enter cryopreservation.147 Taking 
this to the extreme, a situation can be devised in which a posthumously con-
ceived child born twenty-two years after the death of his or her parent, attempts 
to received their entitled share of the deceased parent’s estate. Ostensibly, at 
this point, this share would then need to be taken in proportion from the other 
devisees under the will. The fact that such a scenario could exist under current 
Nevada law shows that a time limit during which a posthumously conceived 
child could be born is a necessary revision of current Nevada law. On the other 
hand, this issue can be avoided entirely if the probate court decides that there 
was no intent from the testator to provide for a posthumously conceived child.  
The Nevada probate code does not contain any statute explicitly controlling 
or defining the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children.148 More-
over, the only definition of posthumous children at all within the Nevada Re-
vised Statutes is found within the definition to “right of representation,” which 
reads: 
“Right of representation” means the method of distributing property by which, 
through inheritance or succession, the descendants of a deceased heir take the 
same share or right in the estate of another person that their parent or other 
ancestor would have taken if living. A posthumous child is deemed living at the 
death of his or her parent.149 
This definition has not been updated since its enactment in 1999.150 Similar 
to Kolacy, Woodward, and Martin B., there is no definitive legislative commen-
tary reflecting whether the term “posthumous child” is inclusive of children 
conceived after the death of their parents, or whether it includes only posthu-
mous children conceived in the traditional sense. However, it should be noted 
that while not all posthumous children fall within the category of posthumously 
conceived children, all posthumously conceived children are posthumous chil-
dren. 
 The need for a distinction and definition of posthumously conceived chil-
dren and posthumous children is obvious when looking at Chapter 111 of the 
NRS. NRS section 111.080 states, “[a] future estate, depending on the contin-
gency of the death of any person without heirs or issue, or children, shall be de-
feated by the birth of a posthumous child of such person capable of taking by 
                                                        
146  Id. § 133.180. 
147  Healthy Baby, supra note 5. 
148  See generally NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 132.010–.390; id. §§ 134.005–.210. 
149  Id. § 132. 290. 
150  1999 Nev. Stat. 2249, 2253. 
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descent.”151 Additionally, NRS section 111.085, entitled “Estates Tail: Enjoy-
ment by Posthumous Child,” states: 
Where an estate shall be any conveyance limited, in remainder, to the son or 
daughter or issue, or to use of the son or daughter or issue of any person to be 
begotten, such son or daughter or issue, born after the decease of his or her par-
ent, shall take the estate in the same proportion, and in the same manner, as if he 
or she had been born in the lifetime of the parent.152 
Traditionally, when reading the sections of the NRS listed above, one 
would consider “posthumous child” to mean a child conceived before, but born 
after, the death of his or her parent. However, as stated earlier, posthumously 
conceived children also fall under the broad category of “posthumous chil-
dren.” Taking the definition of “posthumous child” to be “living at the death of 
his or her parent,”153 one could imagine a scenario under these statutes in which 
a child born twenty years after the death of his or her parent could suddenly lay 
claim to a future interest that had already been bestowed on another benefi-
ciary.  
 There is no case law in the state of Nevada that provides insight on how a 
posthumous child would be treated under this definition. It may be the case 
that, as in Kolacy, Woodward, and Martin B., judges in Nevada would interpret 
the words “posthumous child” broadly and grant inheritance rights to a post-
humously conceived child despite the lack of an explicit statutory grant. 
 Examining the statute in which this definition of “by representation” could 
be put to use, we can see why a statute defining the inheritance rights of post-
humously conceived children would be beneficial.  
NRS section 134.040(2) states:  
If the decedent leaves a surviving spouse and more than one child living, or a 
child and the lawful issue of one or more deceased children, the estate goes one-
third to the surviving spouse and the remainder in equal shares to the children 
and the lawful issue of any deceased child by right of representation.154 
Several hypotheticals can be used to show why an explicit statute would be 
necessary to uphold state and public interests in this matter. First, one can im-
agine a scenario in which the decedent’s intestate estate has already been dis-
tributed in accordance with NRS section 134.040(2). The estate has been divid-
ed among the surviving spouse and their other living children. However, seven 
years after the death of the decedent, the surviving spouse conceives and gives 
birth to a child using the decedent’s genetic material. Using the definition pro-
vided in NRS section 132.290, the estate would then have to be reopened and 
the decedent’s assets redistributed within the new class of heirs in equal shares. 
Because posthumously conceived children could potentially be born up to 
                                                        
151  NEV. REV. STAT. § 111.080. 
152  Id. § 111.085. 
153  Id. § 132. 290. 
154  Id. § 134.040(2). 
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twenty-two years after the harvesting of the required genetic material, such a 
loose definition of “posthumous child” creates problems both in estate distribu-
tion and also with the rule against perpetuities. 
 When using a narrower interpretation of posthumous child, one could also 
imagine a scenario in which the genetic child of the decedent receives nothing 
from the parent’s estate. If “posthumous child” is interpreted strictly in the tra-
ditional sense, any child born through the use of ART after a parent’s death 
would be unable to inherit the share of their parent’s estate, and, under Astrue 
v. Capato, would also be unable to claim Social Security benefits. 
 Both of these scenarios create situations where the results are unfavorable 
to the state, to the posthumously conceived child, and to any other heirs of the 
decedent. Nevada’s current definition, which was more than adequate for the 
traditional definition of posthumous children, has now become vague because 
of increases in technology allowing for the conception and birth of posthu-
mously conceived children after a parent’s death. A vague statement with re-
gard to posthumous children is not sufficient to give the courts and the people 
of Nevada the proper guidance needed to achieve a just result that balances the 
public interest with the interests of the posthumously conceived child. There-
fore, a revised statute, or even a new statute, defining posthumously conceived 
children and granting or excluding their inheritance rights is necessary to pre-
vent the foregoing scenarios that are possible under Nevada’s current statutory 
scheme. 
IV.   POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR A NEVADA STATUTE 
 As with any statute, there are several interests that must be considered, 
weighed, and balanced before a statute becomes law. Here, three main interests 
are at play in a statute addressing the inheritance rights of posthumously con-
ceived children: (1) the interests of the state in making sure estates are adminis-
tered in an orderly manner; (2) the interests of the parents, both in their rights to 
have children and in their duty to provide for them; and (3) the interests of the 
other heirs and beneficiaries that may have interests in the estate. This section 
will identify and discuss several policy considerations for a potential statute 
and will make a recommendation as to how legislators can balance and apply 
these considerations. 
The three factors identified by the Woodward court provide particularly 
useful guidelines for a statute regarding posthumously conceived children. 
However, there are also other considerations that need to be taken into account 
for a potential statute, such as procedural issues. For example, should the pro-
bate court be notified that the surviving partner is attempting to have a posthu-
mous child? Who has the ultimate control/discretion to use the genetic material 
to create a child?  
Overall, in addition to practical and procedural issues, there are four essen-
tial factors that should be addressed in a statute regarding posthumously con-
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ceived children: (1) genetic material, (2) consent, (3) a time limit, and (4) who 
has control over the genetic material. These factors will also need to be bal-
anced against the state’s interest in protecting the reproductive rights of parents, 
closing estates in a reasonable time, and the orderly, timely, and final disposi-
tion of estate property.  
A.   Genetic Material 
 One of the factors identified in the Woodward court that all scholars agree 
on is that the posthumously conceived child must be conceived through the 
decedent’s genetic material.155 This seems to be a logical conclusion. After all, 
why should the state force a decedent’s estate to provide an inheritance to a 
posthumously conceived child that is not related to the decedent?156 Therefore, 
the proposed statute should have explicit language stating that the child con-
ceived posthumously must be genetically related to the decedent to be consid-
ered the decedent’s heir.157  
 Proving that the child is, in fact, the genetic descendent of the deceased 
parent should not be a problem. Since all posthumously conceived children are 
conceived through ART, there should be medical records held by the medical 
professionals detailing and verifying from where and from whom the genetic 
material came.158  
Overall, a requirement that a genetic relationship between the decedent and 
the posthumously conceived child must be shown in order for the child to in-
herit. This requirement provides assurance to the probate court that they are 
permitting the actual child of the decedent to inherit since the decedent is no 
longer around to claim parentage of the child.159 Because a decedent cannot 
claim parentage of a posthumous child, the notion of consent given before 
death is vitally important.  
B.   Consent 
One of the most important concepts one can consider when thinking about 
whether posthumously conceived children will be considered the heirs of the 
deceased parent is the concept of consent. Consent is particularly important in 
the case of posthumously conceived children because the decedents no longer 
have any say in in determining what his or her genetic material will be used for, 
and in the case of inheritance through an intestacy statute, will have no oppor-
                                                        
155  Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 270 (Mass. 2002). 
156  This is not to say that there could not be an instance where a deceased partner would 
have wanted the survivor to create a child through donated genetic material, but in such in-
stances they would have to explicitly provide for them through a testamentary instrument. 
157  See Chester, supra note 20, at 732. 
158  Pennings et al., supra note 3, at 3051 (“[T]he option of posthumous reproduction should 
be offered in the consent form for cryopreservation.”). 
159  See id. 
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tunity to “disinherit” a child they may not have wanted.160 “[T]he creation of 
children posthumously is something about which most people hold strong opin-
ions. That is, few would be indifferent about whether their gametes were used 
after their death to bring children into this world.”161 In an ideal world, there 
would always be a clear answer to the question of whether or not a person 
would like to become a parent of a child after his or her death.162 Unfortunately, 
we do not live in an ideal world, and often people who are trying to create a life 
do not consider their own deaths enough to write out a plan for how their genet-
ic material is to be used after their deaths.  
Because of this reality, a proposed statute should provide clear guidelines 
to the court, family, and medical professionals regarding the decedents’ wishes 
for their genetic material, including whether the decedent consents to becoming 
the parent of a posthumously conceived child. There are two ways to do this. 
First, a statute modeled after the UPC would require a showing of clear and 
convincing evidence of affirmative consent on the part of the deceased donor to 
demonstrate that the deceased intended to function as the parent of the child.163 
Second, there could be a written consent requirement, signaling that the de-
ceased affirmatively consented to his or her genetic material being used to re-
produce posthumously.164  
1.   Clear and Convincing Evidence 
 Under the UPC, the surviving spouse can prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the decedent intended to be the parent of a posthumously con-
ceived child.165 There are some concerns that even though clear and convincing 
evidence is not the lowest burden of proof in a courtroom, it could still provide 
enough wiggle room to lead to struggles in litigation, including the potential for 
surviving spouses to attempt to introduce offhand comments by the decedent 
into evidence.  
Allowing consent to be proved via clear and convincing evidence would 
provide an avenue for those who did not have the opportunity to sign a docu-
ment before their death. However, a potential issue with requiring only clear 
and convincing evidence to posthumous reproduction is that “a person who 
                                                        
160  Weber et al., supra note 58 (“The ethics advisors’ main concern was that there was no 
written consent to perform the procedure and that sperm retrieval could conflict with the ac-
tual wishes of the deceased man.”). 
161  Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Posthumous Collection and Use of 
Reproductive Tissue: A Committee Opinion, 99 FERTILITY & STERILITY, June 2013, at 1842. 
162  Although in some cases, this may happen. See Hecht v. Superior Court of L.A., 20 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. Ct. App. 1993) (California court of appeals honors decedents wishes for his 
sperm to be provided to a named woman for the purposes of having his children after his 
death). 
163  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f)(2)(C) (amended 2010). 
164  See Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 161. 
165  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f)(2)(C). 
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consented to assisted reproduction with the intention of functioning as a parent 
will be treated as a parent regardless of whether the person contemplated post-
humous conception.”166 Further, “[i]n some cases, the only evidence of [the de-
cedents] wishes will be the testimony of a person bearing an apparent conflict 
of interest, namely the one who wishes to use the deceased’s sperm or eggs to 
reproduce.”167  
2.   Written Consent 
An answer to the concerns raised by allowing mere clear and convincing 
evidence to demonstrate a decedent’s intent would be to require a signed writ-
ing stating that the decedent affirmatively consented to have posthumously 
conceived children. A simple way to achieve this would be to require a consent 
form signed at the beginning of an ART treatment.168 These consent forms 
should ask providers of genetic material how they wish their gametes to be 
used after their death, whether they wish to permit their genetic material to be 
used to create a child, and with whom that genetic material will be used.  Pro-
viders should also identify a person who will have control over the gametes in 
the case of death. 
 Such a written consent requirement—allowing posthumously conceived 
children to inherit—is not unheard of.169 Both the UPA and the UPC require a 
“record” signed by the decedent to allow a posthumously conceived child to 
inherit.170 Additionally, California’s probate code mandates a written consent 
form, and requires that the form be signed and dated. The form also requires the 
signatory to identify the designated person who is to control the genetic materi-
al after the death of the decedent.171 Texas requires that a licensed physician 
keep a signed consent form to prove that the decedent consented to the posthu-
mously conceived child becoming his or her heir.172  
 Further, the Ethics Committee for the American Society of Reproductive 
Medicine suggests that medical professionals keep a copy of this consent form 
                                                        
166  Susan N. Gary, Posthumously Conceived Heirs: Where the Law Stands and What to Do 
About It Now, 19 PROB. & PROP., Mar./Apr. 2005, at 35. 
167  Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 161, at 1844. 
168  See generally TEX. FAM. CODE § 160.707 (2007); Edilberto Araújo Filho et al., Postmor-
tem Sperm Retrieval for In Vitro Fertilization Treatment: Care to Be Taken—A Brazilian 
Case Report, 18 JBRA ASSIST. REPROD. 85 (2014), www.jbra.com.br/media/html/JBRA10 
73.html [https://perma.cc/BMP7-NW44] (stating that “[p]rior informed consent of the male 
should be considered as a basic prerequisite for sperm retrieval”). 
169  See TEX. FAM. CODE § 160.707. 
170  See supra Part II. 
171  CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5(a) (2006). 
172  TEX. FAM. CODE § 160.707 (“If a spouse dies before the placement of eggs, sperm, or 
embryos, the deceased spouse is not a parent of the resulting child unless the deceased 
spouse consented in a record kept by a licensed physician that if assisted reproduction were 
to occur after death the deceased spouse would be a parent of the child.”). 
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for their own records and ethical considerations.173 Such a requirement would 
not particularly burden the medical profession.174  
 The benefits of requiring a consent form kept by a licensed physician are 
twofold. First, this requirement will start a steady and reliable chain of evidence 
allowing the court to affirm that the decedent wished to posthumously have a 
child. Second, it would assist medical professionals in knowing who has con-
trol over the genetic material and how the material is to be used after the do-
nor’s death.  
 However, the requirement of written consent is not without its problems. 
For example, the consent form could be lost. “In any such circumstance, the 
party will have to prove: (1) that the document was executed; (2) that it was in-
deed on file with a physician; and (3) that the document cannot be located.”175 
It is suggested then, that the record instead be filed with the court rather than 
with a licensed physician.176 
3.   The Absence of Consent 
Another consideration is what would occur if there was no consent form on 
record upon the decedent’s death. In these instances, the state of Colorado and 
the UPC both allow for clear and convincing evidence to prove consent.177 It is 
possible that this permission could become an issue because “[i]n some cases, 
the only evidence of their wishes will be the testimony of a person bearing an 
apparent conflict of interest, namely the one who wishes to use the deceased’s 
sperm or eggs to reproduce.”178  
This conflict of interest is why it is ultimately recommended that there be a 
requirement of a written affirmative consent form to prove that the decedent 
wished to have a posthumous child, and why ART clinics should also be re-
quired to provide such consent forms at the beginning of treatment.  
C.   The Problem of Post-Mortem Sperm Retrieval179 
 So far this note has discussed a scenario in which decedents have already 
provided their genetic material for use by their loved ones before they die. 
However, this is not always the case. In some circumstances, a person may die 
                                                        
173  Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 161, at 1844. 
174  Id. at 1844; Filho et al., supra note 168. 
175  Ellis, supra note 22, at 437. 
176  Id. 
177  See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f)(1) (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-120(6)(b)(III) 
(2010). 
178  Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 161, at 1844. 
179  While this section specifically addresses postmortem sperm retrieval, as most of the liter-
ature on this subject does, it is equally possible that eggs may be retrieved from a deceased 
woman as well. See generally Jacqueline Clarke, Dying to Be Mommy: Using Intentional 
Parenthood as a Proxy for Consent in Posthumous Egg Retrieval Cases, 2012 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 1331 (2012). 
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before his or her genetic material is preserved, requiring the genetic material to 
be removed from his or her body after death.180 In these cases, the survivor has 
only a twenty-four-hour window of time in which the gametes of the deceased 
are still viable.181 In the majority of cases, this is not enough time to complete 
an entire court proceeding to determine whether or not the decedent consented 
to retrieval.182 In some countries—such as Israel—there is a presumption that 
“a man in a loving relationship with a woman would consent to her having his 
genetic child after death,” and in those countries, postmortem sperm retrieval 
would be permitted.183 Other countries, like the UK, do not allow for postmor-
tem sperm retrieval at all.184  
 Medical professionals are rightly concerned with the lack of consent in 
cases where the survivor asks for postmortem sperm retrieval.185 The main con-
cern is whether “a surviving partner’s request for the removal of gametes from 
the deceased is one with which a physician could ethically comply.”186 The eth-
ical issue here is whether the decedent would have consented to the procedure 
prior to his or her death. “The American Society of Reproductive Medicine 
(“ASRM”) guidelines suggested that postmortem retrieval of sperm should on-
ly be offered if the deceased had given prior consent or his wishes to retrieve 
sperm were known.”187 In contemplating a statute regarding posthumously con-
ceived children, a state must consider whether postmortem sperm retrieval will 
be allowed, and if so, who can use the material to create posthumously con-
ceived children. As mentioned previously, consent is extremely important in 
instances where the donor no longer has any say in the matter, and in almost all 
cases of postmortem sperm retrieval, there is no affirmative consent at all. A 
potential solution to this would involve requiring consent before death to post-
mortem sperm retrieval. In Canada, the Assisted Human Reproduction Regula-
tions dictate that there must be a signed writing stating that the donor was 
aware that his or her genetic material may be used for posthumous reproduction 
and postmortem sperm retrieval.188 With regard to postmortem retrieval of ge-
                                                        
180  See Filho et al., supra note 168 (stating “[p]ostmortem sperm retrieval has been used 
worldwide in assisted reproduction technology”). 
181  Id. (stating “[g]uidelines for PMSR in the medical literature suggest that the procedure 
should be performed within 24 h[ours] after death to obtain motile or vital sperm”). 
182  Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 161, at 1844. 
183  Id. 
184  Id. 
185  Weber et al., supra note 58, at 407–08 (“[I]t might be impossible for the medical team to 
confirm the man’s true wishes on the basis solely of the information provided by the fami-
ly.”). 
186  Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 161, at 1844. 
187  Weber et al., supra note 58, at 408. 
188  Id. (“Before a person removes human reproductive material from a donor’s body after the 
donor’s death for the purpose of creating an embryo, the person shall have a document 
signed by the donor stating that, before consenting to the removal, the donor was informed in 
writing that the human reproductive material will be removed in accordance with the donor’s 
consent to create an embryo for 1 or more of the following purposes, namely, [] the repro-
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netic material, a Nevada statute should follow the Canadian regulations model 
and require written consent before retrieval of genetic material from a deceased 
person. The ethical implications of allowing someone, even a parent or spouse, 
to retrieve genetic material from a deceased person without express consent 
outweighs the interests of a person wanting to posthumously reproduce with the 
deceased. 
D.   Time Limitations 
Estates cannot be held open indefinitely on the chance that a child will be 
conceived and born after a parent’s death. To do so would be unfair to the other 
persons with interests in the decedent’s estate, as well as take up the valuable 
time of courts.189 “If a child born to a decedent after final distribution of the de-
cedent’s estate is entitled to share in the assets, the estate will have to be reo-
pened, the decedent’s property retrieved from the other beneficiaries, and the 
property redistributed, taking into account the interests of the later-born 
child.”190 Posthumously conceived children can be born up to twenty-two years 
after their parents donate their genetic material.191 To leave estates open for that 
long would be inefficient and costly for both the court and the family, and de-
lay the distribution of the estate.192 As discussed above in Part III, Nevada’s 
current laws could allow children born after the distribution of the will to take 
from other beneficiaries of the will. Allowing a posthumously conceived child 
to become a beneficiary of the will twenty-two years after the death of their 
parent would be patently unfair to the other beneficiaries. Therefore, most 
scholars agree that the proper and fair solution would impose a time limit in 
which the posthumously conceived child can inherit from the decedent. Over-
all, there are two factors to analyze when examining time limitations for a stat-
ute regarding posthumously conceived children: the time of conception and the 
length of the time limit itself. 
                                                                                                                                 
ductive use to the person who is, at the time of the donor’s death, the donor’s spouse or 
common-law partner, [] improving assisted reproduction procedures, or [] providing instruc-
tion in assisted reproduction procedures.” (quoting ASSISTED HUMAN REPRODUCTION § 8 
(Manseau, 2007)). 
189  Gary, supra note 166, at 35 (“A decision on the time limit to impose requires balancing 
the need for a timely disposition of an intestate estate with the need to give a surviving par-
ent adequate time make the difficult decision about whether to attempt posthumous concep-
tion.”). 
190  Goodwin, supra note 12, at 274. 
191  Healthy Baby, supra note 5. 
192  Id. 
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1.   Time of Conception 
Many state statutes require a posthumous child to either be conceived or 
born within a two- or three-year period.193 While it is simple to identify exactly 
when a child is born, it is more difficult to identify when the child was con-
ceived. Merriam-Webster’s Medical Dictionary defines conception as: “the 
process of becoming pregnant involving fertilization or implantation or 
both.”194 Traditionally, conception would occur when the genetic materials of 
the mother and father are combined within the mother’s uterus, and create an 
embryo. However, with the use of ART, it is now possible to create embryos 
outside of the mother’s body. It would be prudent for a potential statute to de-
fine the precise conditions for the conception of a posthumous child.  
 Ronald Chester, in his proposed amendments to the UPC, suggests defining 
conception as “the moment of implantation in the uterus of the gestating fe-
male.”195 Utilizing this definition would prevent cases in which embryos are 
created outside of the uterus (and thus meet the fertilization requirement). Oth-
erwise, it would be easy for some parties to claim that their posthumously con-
ceived child was in being before the statutory limits, even when there is a pos-
sibility that the embryo would not be implanted in a uterus and born before the 
statutory limits ran out. It would be beneficial to establish in a statute that: “a 
posthumously conceived child is not conceived when it is formed in the labora-
tory, or preserved for future use; it is conceived when it begins to grow in the 
uterus of the gestating female.”196 
2.   Length 
Many states have imposed a time limit of two to three years for conception 
and birth of a posthumously conceived child.197 These imposed time limits give 
the states and their respective courts a definite timeline during which a posthu-
mously conceived child can have an impact on an estate. This allows the pro-
bate courts to distribute estates within a timely manner and gives a degree of 
certainty to the other beneficiaries of the decedent’s estate.  
While two- to three-year periods may seem reasonable, and even just in 
some circumstances, there are many reasons why a slightly expanded period of 
time benefits the surviving parent attempting to produce a posthumous child. 
                                                        
193  See CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5(c) (2006) (two years); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-
120(11)(a) (2010) (three years for conception); IOWA CODE § 633.220A(1)(c) (2011) (two 
years); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9.391.1(A) (2011) (three years). But see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-
785(a)(2) (2014) (child must be in utero within one year of death). 
194  Conception, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/concep 
tion [https://perma.cc/9GNJ-GVNK] (last visited Apr. 28, 2017). 
195  Chester, supra note 20, at 729. 
196  Id. 
197  See CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (two years); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-20 (three years for 
conception); IOWA CODE § 633.220A (two years); LA. STAT. ANN. § 391.1 (three years). But 
see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-785 (child must be in utero within one year of death). 
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First, a time limit of only two years may lead surviving partners to “rush” into 
the process of conceiving a child, without first considering the implications of 
having a child. Second, as stated earlier, ART is not always successful. The low 
success rates of ART procedures could mean several months of trying before a 
viable pregnancy occurs, and even then, there is no guarantee that the mother or 
surrogate would carry the child to term.198 
Members of the Task Force on Ethics and the Law of the European Society 
of Human Reproduction and Embryology (“ESHRE”) suggest a period of at 
least one year, and a maximum of five years before grieving family members 
be allowed to use the genetic material to reproduce.199 They reason that the 
grief of the surviving family member, combined with a short statutory time lim-
it, could cause him or her to make a hasty decision.200 Feelings of guilt or ideal-
ization of the deceased could lead the survivor to rush into a decision he or she 
may later regret.201 The five year period, they reason, would “assure practical 
arrangement for the inheritance while giving the surviving partner the possibil-
ity to plan a family with more than one child.”202 
Third, the Supreme Court has recognized that “in the context of gender 
discrimination . . . the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and ef-
ficiency.”203 These values include protecting vulnerable citizens from the 
“overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy.”204 Likewise, here, both legis-
lators considering a potential state statute and probate courts should value the 
potential benefits to posthumously conceived children, along with the speed 
and efficiency in which they can close estates.  
To reconcile the ethical and policy concerns, it is recommended that a Ne-
vada statute balance the standard tests of three years, with the ESHRE commit-
tee recommendation of five years, which states: “[t]o assure a practical ar-
rangement for the inheritance while giving the surviving partner the possibility 
to plan a family with more than one child, a maximum period of [five] years is 
proposed within which the child(ren) must be conceived and born.”205 A statute 
specifically naming a four year period in which the child must be conceived 
and born is recommended. 
 This four-year period for conception and birth would allay the fears of 
physicians concerned with the birth of “grief babies,” as well as give sufficient 
                                                        
198  Shah, supra note 36, at 549 (“It takes an average of seven insemination attempts over 4.4 
menstrual cycles to establish pregnancy.”). 
199  Pennings et al., supra note 3, at 3052 (“An obligatory minimum waiting period of a year 
seems necessary to prevent hasty and ill-considered decisions.”). 
200  Id. 
201  Id. 
202  Id. 
203  Goodwin, supra note 12, at 275. 
204  Id. 
205  Pennings et al., supra note 3, at 3052. 
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time for ART treatments to be successful.206 This time period would also allow 
for the family situation to become more stable, and thus would be more benefi-
cial for the health of the posthumously conceived child. Further, this defined 
requirement prevents posthumously conceived children from being born indefi-
nitely and, in turn, reducing the estate of the decedent into smaller and smaller 
shares.207 Additionally, a four-year period is not so lengthy that estates and oth-
er beneficiaries and heirs of the decedent would be robbed of the benefits of 
their inheritance. 
E.   Control of Genetic Material 
 Now that this note has addressed the issues of what genetic material to use 
and when to use it, it is now important to discuss who may use the genetic ma-
terial of the deceased to create a posthumously conceived child. Physicians rec-
ommend that the “gametes or embryos cannot be directed at or requested by 
specifically others like parents or other family members of the deceased per-
son(s). Casuistry, especially for requests by parents of a deceased, indicates that 
they want to hold on to the deceased by means of the newly created grand-
child.”208 Therefore, it is necessary that during the consent process, the donor 
identifies precisely who can use his or her genetic material and for what pur-
pose the material may be used. 
In general, the recipient of the donor’s preserved genetic material will be 
the donor’s partner of the opposite sex. However, there may be some instances 
in which a donor may wish to give control over his or her genetic material to 
someone who cannot use it to biologically reproduce themselves, such as a 
same-sex partner. 
Many state statutes give the rights to posthumous reproduction only to the 
decedent’s surviving spouse.209 However, there may be many other scenarios in 
which a person may wish to have a child outside of marriage, such as the case 
of a longtime partner.210 Ronald Chester has suggested using the term “benefi-
ciary”211 for a broader statutory scope.  
                                                        
206  The timing for conception and a live birth may vary between individuals, although it is 
recognized that the chance of successful ART treatments reduces with age. See ART Success 
Rates, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/art/artdata/in 
dex.html [https://perma.cc/9ZL5-X2H7] (last updated Mar. 8, 2017). 
207  As discussed supra Part I, the ART techniques used to create posthumously conceived 
children have a higher chance for multiple births. Although it is highly unlikely, a hypothet-
ical scenario in which twins or triplets are born to the surviving partner every two years until 
it is physically impossible for them to do so can occur. This gives a new meaning to the term 
“fertile decedent,” and could lead to estates being reduced to nothing without proper time 
constraints on the birth of posthumously conceived children. 
208  Pennings et al., supra note 3, at 3052. 
209  See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE § 160.707 (2007). 
210  See Marshal S. Willick, The Evolving Concept of Marriage and Coming Convergence of 
Marital and Non-Marital Property and Support Law, 19 NEV. LAW., May 2011, at 6. 
211  Chester, supra note 20, at 732. 
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In today’s modern world, there are many conceptions of “family” outside 
of marriage in which a person may wish to raise a child. Marriage is not a re-
quirement for parenthood, and as such a statute defining the rights of posthu-
mously conceived children should not limit itself only to “spouses.” Use of the 
term “beneficiaries” in conjunction with naming requirements on the consent 
form should be sufficient to cover various family structures.  
F.   Final Practical and Procedural Issues 
1.   Notice to the Court 
It would be practical within a statute allowing for the inheritance of post-
humously conceived children to include a section in which notice to the court 
and interested parties of an attempt to create a posthumously conceived child is 
required at or near the beginning of probate.212 Such a notice requirement 
would alert the court that there may be a need to set aside a share of the 
decedent’s estate.213 This share could potentially be set aside or flagged at the 
beginning of probate and put into a trust. In the event that ART treatments are 
unsuccessful, and a posthumous child is not conceived, this reserved share 
could then be distributed equally among the rest of the heirs or beneficiaries.214  
A statutory requirement for notice to the court that triggers a set-aside 
share would address the rights of the other heirs and beneficiaries that have an 
interest in an expedited probate process. This requirement would allow them 
the opportunity to contest the posthumously conceived child’s share within the 
statutory period, and allow them to receive their share promptly, and in the 
event that the posthumous child is not born, would allow them to recover the 
rest of their inheritance. 
CONCLUSION  
 Because of the disparate impact that a lack of statute places upon posthu-
mously conceived children versus traditionally conceived children, it is in the 
best interests of Nevada to enact a statute addressing this issue. Astrue v. Ca-
pato bases the receipt of Social Security benefits on state intestacy statutes, a 
state without such a statute places posthumously conceived children at an eco-
nomic disadvantage. A simple definition of posthumous children within a state 
intestacy statute without specifically addressing postumously concieved 
children’s special circumstances is not sufficient to prevent the complicated is-
sues that arise when posthumously conceived children do not have a place 
within the state’s probate code.  
                                                        
212  Id. at 743. 
213  Id. at 744. 
214  Id. 
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 While it is obvious that the Author wholeheartedly supports a statute grant-
ing inheritance rights to posthumously conceived children, a statute expressly 
disinheriting posthumously conceived children would also be necessary if the 
legislature does not wish to grant inheritance rights to posthumously conceived 
children. Should the state of Nevada consider enacting a statute regarding the 
rights of posthumously conceived children, the following factors must be con-
sidered. Such a statute should include a strict definition insisting that it be the 
decedent’s genetic material used to create his or her posthumously conceived 
heir.  
A statute should require the express written consent of the decedent stating 
that he or she consents to creating and supporting the posthumously conceived 
child after death. Such consent should be provided at the beginning of ART 
treatments in the shape of a written form, for maximum consideration by the 
potential parents, as well as for consistent record keeping.  
To balance the state’s interests of timely estate distribution and the private 
interests of providing financial support for a young child, a time limit should be 
placed on the conception and birth of a posthumous child. To give adequate re-
spect to the grieving process and to account for the inherent difficulties of con-
ceiving a child through ART, a time period of four years is recommended.  
Further, a statute must explicitly address who may control the genetic ma-
terial after the donor’s death. The donor should be required to identify who will 
have control over his or her genetic material and define the scope of usage of 
the material. A simple definition of “beneficiary” should be used within the 
statute to be sensitive to today’s various family dynamics. Further, the earlier-
mentioned consent form should allow the donor to identify this beneficiary.  
Finally, the state should consider adding a notice requirement to the statute. 
The potential parent of the posthumous child would be required to inform the 
court and the other interested parties that they are actively attempting (or are 
planning to attempt) to create a posthumous child during the statutory limit. 
This notice would allow the court to set aside a share in trust for the potential 
child, and settle the rest of the estate accordingly. If the potential parent is una-
ble to conceive a posthumous child, this share could then be distributed to the 
rest of the interested parties.  
Enacting a statute that addresses posthumously conceived children helps 
both the state and its citizens. Posthumously conceived children are born with a 
severe economic disadvantage through no fault of their own. Without a statute 
expressly granting posthumously conceived children inheritance rights, these 
children cannot inherit from their genetic parent, cannot be the beneficiaries of 
life insurance policies, cannot receive Social Security Survivors benefits, and in 
some cases, may not even be considered the descendants of their genetic par-
ents for the purposes of a trust. In the interest of providing a clear guideline for 
judges, and giving posthumously conceived children the equal protection of the 
laws, it is recommended that the Legislature of the State of Nevada enact a 
statute addressing inheritance rights to posthumously conceived children. 
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